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Default Options in Economic Games:
experiments demonstrating a ‘default pull’ effect and arbitrarily 
constructed preferences
Nikhil Dhingra, Zach Gorn, Andrew Kenera
Introduction 
 By now, a large literature has used simple economic games, like the standard one-
shot dictator game (see Forsythe et al., 1994), to analyze so-called social preferences.  In this 
game, a “dictator” chooses how to divide an experimental endowment of money between 
herself and an anonymous, passive “receiver”.  If players are selfish, then rational choice 
predicts they should keep the entire endowment for themselves.  Numerous experiments, 
however, have shown that dictators give away on average more than 20% (Camerer, 2003), 
even when efforts are made to ensure recipient anonymity (thereby eliminating any concern 
for reputation, future interaction, or punishment).  Various attempts have been made to 
reconcile this behavior with rational choice by assuming people have social preferences that 
in some way incorporate concern for others’ payoffs (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Because these games use real-money endowments, typically without time pressures 
or complicated contexts, it would seem that a player’s actions reflect a clear and reasoned 
preference.  In the present paper, we challenge this notion by presenting evidence of a strong 
“default pull” effect: Choices are affected by the presence of a subtle default option, even 
when the default itself is not chosen.  We demonstrate this default pull effect in a standard 
dictator game with seemingly innocuous default options that appear to be a feature of the 
software presenting the game; i.e., the first in an apparently randomized list of allocation 
options is checked off by default.  Such defaults obviously do not convey normative 
information about what to choose and, in fact, were often unnoticed by our participants. 
Although virtually every participant in our experiment denied that the default could have 
affected their choices, they were more inclined to give away the endowment (on average 
over 20%) when presented with a generous default option than when presented with a 
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selfish one.  Unlike many previous findings showing that people stick with the default 
(see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), the default pull effect sometimes involves participants 
staying with the default (e.g. when the default is sharing the endowment equally or keeping 
everything) and sometimes involves moving substantially away from the default (e.g. when 
the default involves giving everything away).  Our findings add to our understanding of 
default biases by showing that even in a simple environment with clear incentives, people 
can be unconsciously affected by the presence of a default option.  
Before moving to a description of the experiment, we briefly review findings from the 
literature on default biases, dictator games, and anchoring effects, and then differentiate our 
default pull from them.
Default Biases
Johnson et al. (1993) examines recent changes made in the insurance laws of 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey and illustrates how simple framing manipulations (changing 
default settings) can lead consumers to make inconsistent choices when evaluating the 
premiums and benefits associated with insurance purchases.  Both states introduced a new 
insurance plan granting the option of lower insurance rates with limited suing rights (tort), 
but New Jersey set this new plan as the default while Pennsylvania featured the alternative 
full tort option (higher rates and full suing rights) as the default.  75% of Pennsylvanians 
retained the full right to sue, while only 20% of New Jersey purchasers actively chose to 
acquire the same rights. With limited tort as the default, Pennsylvanians could have paid 
over $200 million dollars less for auto insurance.  In some cases, it is likely that defaults 
carry normative value; purchasing insurance can be a relatively complex task and people 
may often assume that the default is best for the standard, average consumer.  Similarly, 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) discuss the ramifications of default options in the context of the 
Medicare prescription drug program.  Participants eligible for both, but who failed to sign 
up for a plan, were assigned to default plans set by the government.  While they could freely 
8     Spring 2010 | SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, & Economics Undergraduate Journal Spring 2010 | SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, & Economics Undergraduate Journal      9
switch to a plan that would better suit their medical needs, many failed to do so. 
Korobkin (1998) demonstrates a similar default effect with legal contract default rules. 
Law student participants provided advice to clients in hypothetical contract negotiation 
scenarios with the content of the legal default terms manipulated between experimental 
groups.  The results suggest that the choice of legal default terms affects not only the final 
terms contracting parties will agree upon, but also their actual preferences for these terms. 
The study shows the effects of status quo and default biases, suggesting that if parties perceive 
legal default terms as part of the status quo, then their preferences will shift in favor of those 
terms more than they would if other terms were the legal defaults.  Default options have the 
power not only to influence an agent’s actions, but also an agent’s underlying preferences.
Abadie and Gay (2004) examine default options within the opt-in/opt-out structure 
of organ donations.  The study compares opt-in systems of informed consent, in which 
one must demonstrate explicit consent to being a donor, with opt-out systems of presumed 
consent, in which a person is classified as a potential donor when there is no explicit 
opposition.  The survey results show that people retained the provided default option, but 
that switching the default option from explicit to presumed consent would substantially 
increase donation rates.  Clearly, default options wield powerful influence over decisions of 
considerable significance.   
Dictator Games
Dictator games are notoriously sensitive to descriptions and context, and studies often 
present the game in a context-laden environment.  For example, when simply expanding 
the dictator’s choice set to allow taking from the receiver’s initial endowment, players rarely 
choose to transfer money and most choose to take from the receiver (Bardsley et al., 2005; 
List, 2007).  An immediate concern is that such studies are susceptible to endowment 
effects, for the language used implies the assignment of a property right to one of the 
players (e.g. “you have 10 dollars,” or “player Y has 10 dollars”).  Further, the experimental 
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design of such games often implies some normatively appropriate behavior that can have 
a significant influence on dictators’ decisions.  Krupka and Weber (2008) showed that 
dictators behave more equitably when the endowment is initially split equally between 
the two players (“bully” game) than when the entire endowment is given initially to the 
dictator (“standard” game).  The results show that dictators believe it is more socially 
acceptable to keep the majority of the initial endowment in the standard game, but it is 
not acceptable when framed in terms of taking from the receiver’s initial endowment, such 
as in the bully game.  To address these concerns, we went through meticulous efforts to 
construct a purely abstract environment by allowing dictators to merely select the payoff 
double of their choosing, thereby eradicating the normative implications associated with 
initial endowments. 
The positive amount consistently given away in dictator games makes it difficult to 
describe dictator preferences in terms of only outcomes.  Some studies attempt to rationalize 
such systematic behavioral inconsistencies by attributing them to the fact that motivation 
for giving may not be adequately captured by monetary payoffs alone.  Hayashi (2008) 
finds evidence that people who are not willing to create unequal distributions of wealth in 
their favor are nonetheless willing to permit such randomly generated inequality to persist. 
He finds that participants appear to exploit omission bias in a self-serving manner, failing 
to act only when omission is in their self-interest.  Dana et al. (2006) finds that people 
have an “illusory preference” for fairness: They dislike appearing unfair to themselves or 
others when the causal link between their action and outcome is transparent; however, 
when transparency is relaxed they tend to act more selfishly, exploiting the uncertainty, or 
“moral wiggle room” between the distributional fairness of their action and its outcome. 
Another reason is that people may be compelled to give when in fact they truly prefer a 
purely self-interested outcome; and, vice-versa, they may be compelled to take more than 
they would normally if presented with the costless opportunity.  In Dana (2006), people 
are responding to some consistent desire (don’t appear unfair) and thus, the behavior is able 
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to be rationalized.  Our study involves an exploration of a broader hypothesis than many 
of the aforementioned studies: We think that people are affected by normatively irrelevant 
contextual factors, regardless of whether such factors are part of the individual’s payoff 
function.  
Default Pull Effect
In this section, we aim to disentangle the default pull effect from traditional default, 
status quo, and anchoring-adjustment effects.  Thaler and Sunstein (2008) emphasize that 
people tend to stick with the default, suggesting that default effects are defined discretely 
(e.g. opt-in or opt-out) rather than continuously.  However, our results showed that 
participants sometimes retained the default and sometimes moved substantially away from 
it.  Although almost every participant denied the possibility of being affected by the default 
when surveyed, the data strongly suggest otherwise.
It is important to note that the default pull is not anchoring in the classical sense. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe anchoring as a process by which “people make 
estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer” (p. 
1178)., and anchors are typically used when people are uncertain about an objectively 
correct answer to a question.  The dictator game, however, does not involve any decision 
under uncertainty because there is no “right” answer; rather, it is a matter of choice involving 
personal preference, and preferences are subjective and not typically thought of as being 
anchored (Simmons et al., 2009; see discussion on self-generated anchors).  A dictator game 
outcome should be solely a function of individual subjective preference; anchors should be 
irrelevant.  Many anchoring studies present a clearly arbitrary and uninformative anchor, 
such as the number generated by a wheel of fortune (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) or 
the first three digits of the participant’s social security number (Ariely et al., 2003).  Our 
experiment, however, features relevant default options that, unlike anchors, can be retained. 
In general, default options often carry some normative value.  They are typically 
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suggestions that are meant to actively influence choice with the individual’s best interest in 
mind (e.g. default funds, default insurance programs; see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  Some 
anchors, particularly when relevant to the estimated value, may appear to carry normative 
value.  Our default settings, on the other hand, carry no normative value.  We avoided this 
in a few ways:  First, we did not explicitly inform participants of the default options, nor 
were they actively endorsed or suggested in some way.  Second, each default was preselected 
as a filled-in bubble on a simple computer interface, thereby appearing to be a feature of 
the game software.   Third, the scrambling of the payoff doubles suggested that the top 
preselected option was randomly generated. 
Experiment 
Participants
Participants (n = 50) were all students at the University of Pennsylvania, all of 
who participated voluntarily in response to an online advertisement for paid decision 
experiments. All participants gave informed consent prior to the experiment. Four sessions 
were run, the first with 12 participants, the second with 18, the third with 8, and the fourth 
with 12 participants. 
Proceedures
We presented each participant with a series of four dictator-type games, three of which 
had different “default” conditions, or preselected options of wealth allocation between 
themselves and another anonymous player.  Default options were designated as such by 
being the first and only “preselected” allocation on the list of thirteen wealth allocations. 
The fourth “no-default” condition simply had no preselected payoff double.  We arrayed 
the payoff doubles along a straightforward, minimalist interface, with the checked off 
default allocation appearing at the top of the list.  By doing this, we avoided the inevitable 
normative implications of context-laden settings.  We ran four sessions with 50 participants 
in total. In every session, each participant received the four-game series in a different order 
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(4! gives us 24 possible combinations). 
Participants were situated at computer terminals for the entirety of the experiment and 
were given visual as well as oral instructions. No interaction other than via computer took 
place.  First, participants were randomly assigned identification numbers that designated 
their role; odd-numbered participants were determined to be dictators (Player X), and even-
numbered were receivers (Player Y), however specific role assignments were withheld until 
after the experiment.  We used the strategy method to elicit choices; that is, participants 
made all decisions under the assumption that they were a dictator (Player X) and after 
all decisions were made, specific role assignments were revealed.  Participants were then 
instructed that they would play a simple economic game on decision-making with another 
anonymous and random person in the room and that their payment for participation in 
the experiment would be determined in part by their and/or others’ decisions.  Regardless 
of role assignment, players were informed that each would receive an equal base pay.  
Each participant completed a series of four consecutive dictator games.  The series was 
scrambled so that each player received a different ordering of the games.  We ran all 4! = 
24 possible combinations of these four rounds.  In each round, thirteen wealth allocations 
were presented as payoff doubles in a multiple choice format arrayed along the computer 
interface, and participants were instructed to ensure the allocation of their choosing was 
selected before clicking “submit” (see Fig. 1 below).  The very first allocation at the top 
of the list was the default setting in three of the four conditions and was designated as 
such simply by being preselected, or bubbled-in, on the screen (e.g. 10,0 in Fig. 1).  The 
other twelve allocations were all randomized.  Ten of these twelve allocations consisted of 
all the other possible whole-number allocations adding up to ten, and the remaining two 
allocations were “distractors,” which did not add up to ten.  The “distractors” are Pareto-
dominated, and thus, should not be chosen, but we included them in an effort to promote 
independence (along with the scrambled orderings) so that each player would treat each 
round as a new choice.  In the fourth “no-default” condition, there was no pre-selected 
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option on the screen, so participants simply chose from among the thirteen allocations.  
Figure 1: Interface 
After participants completed all four rounds, a screen appeared with their calculated 
monetary compensation (at an exchange rate of $0.25 per point).  We revealed how dictator 
and receiver roles were determined, after which all participants filled out a brief survey with 
questions relevant to their performance during the experiment.
Results
Dictator Choices
Our results indicated that participants were affected by the default wealth allocation 
presented in the first game, and that initial effect persisted throughout all four rounds. 
Statistical analyses compared the mean allocation (and average payout) to the receiver (Y) 
across all four rounds in each condition.  Condition A denotes the group of participants 
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whose first game had a (10,0) default, Condition B saw a (5,5) default, Condition C 
saw a (0,10) default, and Condition D saw no-default.  The mean allocation to Player 
Y in Condition A was 1.44, in Condition B was 3.08, in Condition C was 3.58, and in 
Condition D was 1.56. 
Figure 2
Figure 2 shows the mean allocation of dollars given to the receiver over all four rounds, 
according to the first-round default allocation. We found differences in the mean allocations 
between Condition A and Condition B that were significant (t=3.487, df=98, p<.001) and 
differences between Condition A and Condition C that were significant (t=4.512, df=102, 
p<.0001).  Differences in the mean allocations between Condition B and Condition D 
were also significant (t=3.200, df=98, p=.0019), and differences between Condition C 
and Condition D were significant (t=4.218, df=98, p<.0001).  However, differences in 
the mean allocations between Condition A and Condition D, and differences between 
Condition B and Condition C were not significant (t=.283, df=98, p=.777) and (t=.950, 
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df=98, p=.344), respectively.  Furthermore, an ANOVA test returned p<.001, indicating 
that the means of all four conditions were not equal. Since there are statistically significant 
differences in the mean allocations to the receiver across all four rounds, and not in just the 
first round, we interpret this as evidence that the default allocation that participants saw in 
the first game affected their responses across all four rounds of the game.  In addition, we 
observed that participants allocated fairly consistently over all four rounds, which can be 
seen visually in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1
Fluctuations in the flatness of each condition across all four rounds can essentially 
be attributed to random variation, as approximately one participant in each condition 
distinctly skews the data by varying his/her responses significantly more than the others. 
Figure 3.2 shows much smoother curves by removing just five data points: two from round 
1 and 2 for the (0,10) default condition, and three from round 2 and 3 for the (10, 0), 
(5,5), and no-default conditions.
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Figure 3.2
Strong positive correlations between round 1 and round 2 (r =.76), round 1 and 
round 3 (r =.47), and round 1 and round 4 (r =.60) further highlight the fact that there is 
a strong effect of the participants’ round 1 decision on subsequent rounds.  Furthermore, 
from Figures 2 and 3.1-3.2 we gather that Conditions A and D have similar mean 
allocations across all four rounds, and Conditions B and C have similar mean allocations, 
with participants in Conditions B and C allocating nearly $2 more on average than those in 
Conditions A and D.  Our results further demonstrate that participants in these conditions 
were not simply sticking with the default allocation.  Rather, they actively shifted from the 
default, but still remained within close proximity in terms of wealth distribution.  This is 
where our study parses default bias from our observed “default-pull” effect.  Figures 4.1-4.4 
help demonstrate this observation:
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Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.3
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Figure 4.5
As can be seen from the above graphs, in Conditions A and D the modal response was 
(10,0), whereas in Conditions B and C the modal response was (5,5).  In Condition B, just 
as many participants chose (6,4) as they did (5,5), while in no other condition did more 
than one participant choose (6,4) in the first game.  This shows that in Condition B, those 
who actively strayed from (5,5) nonetheless often remained very close to the default.  In 
Condition C, almost half the participants chose (5,5) in the first game, demonstrating that 
while they would likely not stick with the “hyper-fair” (0,10) default (only one participant 
did), they still were much more fair than in Conditions A and D.
Survey Responses
General responses from the survey are shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.  The most 
intriguing effect we found from the surveys was that only approximately 5% of participants 
believe the default allocation affected their choices in that particular game, even while the 
data indicate that the first default affected not only the first round game, but also the 
following rounds.  This result of two people who believe the default affected that round can 
essentially be attributed to chance  (note: the responses from one participant who answered 
“no” for the first question of “did you notice the default settings?” and “yes” to “did the 
default affect your decision in that particular game?” were discarded from the survey data 
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analysis because those answers are inconsistent). This means that participants were unwilling 
to admit that the default affected them and/or that the default had a subconscious influence 
on their decisions.  However, participants were willing to acknowledge their degree of 
selfishness.  When asked how generous they felt they were in their allocations on a five-
point scale, only 11 percent of participants said “generous” or “very generous” (see figure 
5.2).  This is somewhat inconsistent with the data given that this group was fairly generous 
in comparison to other dictator studies, with a total mean allocation of $2.42 to Player Y 
across all conditions.  Thus, people believe that they are, for the most part, selfish in their 
decisions, but are unwilling to acknowledge that their degree of selfishness might have been 
influenced by the default options.
Figure 5.1
Discussion
Like many studies in the field of behavioral economics, we find results inconsistent 
with models that assume people’s preferences are defined solely over payoffs, outcomes, or 
consequences.  But our findings go further.  According to a purely consequentialist model, 
default rules should be theoretically extraneous features on choice; however, we find that 
presenting participants with default wealth allocations significantly affects decision-making 
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in dictator games.  Our findings show participants giving over $3 on average to a passive 
and anonymous receiver in two of the default conditions.  This begs the question: Can we 
interpret a significantly positive mean allocation—as much as $3.58 in the (0,10) default 
condition—as a simple preference for a fair or efficient outcome?  Our findings suggest 
otherwise
Studies with similar results inconsistent with preferences attempt to rationalize this 
irrational behavior, attributing such inconsistencies to self-serving biases, such as self-
serving omission bias.  Hayashi finds that people who do not actively choose unequal 
wealth distributions are nonetheless willing to let randomly generated inequality persist 
when it is self-serving.  However, our results suggest that such inconsistencies are not able 
to be rationalized and are thus not necessarily attributable to self-serving biases, for we see 
effects when the default option represents both equal and “hyper-fair” allocations, such as 
(5,5) and (0,10).  We find the greatest effects with the (0,10) and (5,5) default conditions, 
and these effects are in the other direction, with people giving significantly more on average. 
The self-serving bias theory would predict our default setting of (10,0), which is essentially 
a randomly generated purely self-interested and self-serving option, to result in more selfish 
behavior; it would also suggest that an initial “hyper-fair” allocation will essentially be 
disregarded and treated as a standard game, but we observe something different. Moreover, 
we find no significant differences between the (10,0) default condition and the no-default 
condition; participants essentially treated each of these games the same. 
While we do not see the purely self-interested default of (10,0) affecting outcomes, 
we do see the default (5,5) and (0,10)—the more generous default allocations—affecting 
outcomes, but not in a manner that is consistent with the traditional views of default or 
status quo bias. Our results show that participants do not simply stick with the default or 
“do nothing” (i.e. leave initial wealth allocations as they were), but rather chose allocations 
with distributions in the general direction of the initial default allocation. Thus, it appears 
that the default has a somewhat mysterious and anomalous effect different from a simple 
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bias toward the present state; similar to a subtle anchoring effect, we call this the “default-
pull” effect. Rather than defining default bias by the traditional bright-line test of either 
doing nothing or doing something, our “default-pull” concept defines the present state 
along a continuous variable, a continuum that shows how people can be biased toward a 
similar (but different) state as the default.
One way to view our overall results is that although people may not necessarily 
consciously care about the causal path that leads to an outcome, causal paths nonetheless 
affect their choices. As illustrated by our survey responses, of the people who noticed the 
default setting, about 95% said that it did not affect their choices. Most people did not 
admit to the possibility of the default setting having any influence on their decision.  One 
participant said, “I noticed that there was a pre-selected option.  This did not affect my 
decision because originally I was going to allocate some points to the other player already.” It 
is unclear whether this is a statement of true preferences or simply an ex-post rationalization 
of the “default-pull” effect. Another participant said, ““Yes, in the first round of the game 
there was a default setting…it did have some leverage on my decision making, but not 
significantly.” Our data tells a different story, however, showing a significant inconsistency 
between the participants’ subjective responses (which could very well be cheap talk) and 
their actual actions. This discrepancy strikingly reveals the behavioral component of our 
study. One participant who was presented with the default condition of (0,10) in round 1 
tellingly wrote, “Yes, [I did notice the default] and was trying to make choices so that the 
probability was close to 50-50,” which is an interesting answer that is consistent with our 
aggregate data for the (0,10) condition. 
While our findings are robust, we hope that they serve to spur more theoretical and 
empirical research on the dynamics of human decision-making.  For instance, a follow-up 
experiment could be conducted to see if participants, knowing that they are a Player Y, would 
pay a premium to have the Player X with whom they are matched see a default allocation 
of (5,5) or (0,10) in the first round.  The participant would be shown the data from our 
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experiment, which indicates a Player Y should pay a premium of up to $2 to have Player 
X placed in (5,5) or (0,10) default conditions.  Thus, there are many more questions to be 
explored, and some future research should be aimed at discovering the causes and origins 
of such a “default-pull” effect. And, of course, while disentangling behavioral anomalies is a 
pursuit in and of itself, the ultimate goal of our research is to enhance the predictive power 
of economic models. 
Some critics argue that selfish preferences do not necessarily mean maximizing 
monetary payoffs, for some may derive utility from other-regarding behavior.  However, this 
assertion assumes that people will show consistent preferences for some particular outcome, 
which is not always the case.  Ariely et al. (2003) find that people’s initial preferences are 
not well-defined, even arbitrary, but become articulated in the process of making a decision 
(Ariely et al., 2003).  Participants’ absolute valuations of goods are arbitrary, but relative 
valuations of different amounts of the good appear orderly, as if supported by demand 
curves derived from fundamental preferences.  This phenomenon they coin “coherent 
arbitrariness” is consistent with the large body of literature on revealed and constructed 
preferences, which says that initial preferences or valuations are malleable but then become 
precisely defined relative to the initial arbitrary point. 
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